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UNITED STATES: DECONSTRUCTING THE
AMERICAN FAMILY - DEVELOPMENTS IN
FAMILY LAW DURING 1993
Margaret F. Brinig* and Lynn D. Wardle**
I. INTRODUCTION
Persons unfamiliar with the American legal system might be dis-
mayed by the variety and inconsistency of developments in domestic
relations law during 1993. The key to comprehending family law in the
United States is to know that, within the broad parameters set by the
Constitution and minimal federal legislation, each of the fifty Ameri-
can states retains substantial constitutional autonomy when regulating
domestic relations. As a result, "a hundred flowers bloom" in American
family law-in the form of tremendously varied (sometimes diametri-
cally inconsistent) statutes, policies and doctrines. Despite national
trends, novelties or developments of potentially broad interest that oc-
cur every year, the family law in any particular state may differ signifi-
cantly from that in any other state as to almost any topic or detail of
domestic relations. Given space limitations, this article reviews only the
most notable developments in American family law during 1993.'
II. SPOUSAL AND QUASI-SPOUSAL RELATIONS
There was no "landmark" decision regarding regulation of mar-
riages in America in 1993. The cases reflected many different themes,
but perhaps the most dominant undercurrent was the continuing deval-
uation and the loss of understanding of the role of marital relations in
the United States. However, the "marginalization of marriage" is not
* Professor, George Mason University School of Law.
** Professor, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
See Linda D. Elrod, Summary of the Year in Family Law, 27 FAM LQ 485 (1994); Linda
D. Elrod & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States, 27 FAM L Q 515 (1994); Paul
M. Kurtz, Annual Survey of Periodical Literature, 27 FAM L Q 747 (1994).
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new; it has been a dominant pattern in American legal culture for
twenty-five years.
A. Regulation of Marriage Formation and Premarital Arrangements
1. Same-Sex Marriage
The most widely discussed case dealing with marriage was Baehr
v. Lewin,2 which involved a suit by homosexual couples seeking relief
against Hawaii's marriage requirement statute permitting only hetero-
sexual marriages.' The trial court upheld the requirement as a matter
of law. The Hawaii Supreme Court vacated and remanded, finding un-
resolved factual questions.
The first issue raised in the case was whether the "right to marry"
protected by the Hawaii Constitution extended to same-sex couples.'
Although the plaintiffs based their claim on only state law, the Hawaii
Supreme Court relied primarily on decisions defining the fundamental
right of marriage under the United States Constitution.5 The court
concluded that there is no "fundamental constitutional right to same-
sex marriage" because such a relationship is not "rooted in tradition"
or "at the base of all our civil and political institutions."6
Next, the court examined whether homosexuals seeking marriage
licenses were denied the "equal protection" guarantee of the Hawaii
Constitution, which is "more elaborate" than that in the U.S. Constitu-
tion.7 Relying on a U.S. Supreme Court decision invalidating an inter-
racial marriage law, the Hawaii Supreme Court summarily declared
that Hawaii's marriage regulation statute facially "discriminates based
on sex against the applicant couples," thus violating the state guarantee
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
HAW. REV STAT. § 572-1(3) (1985) (referring to "the man" and "the woman" as the
applicants for marriage license).
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55.
' The Hawaii Supreme Court's exhaustive opinion discussing the major privacy decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court failed to mention, much less analyze and discuss, the only decision of the
Supreme Court considering whether homosexual behavior is a constitutionally protected funda-
mental right. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
o Baehr, 853 P.2d at 57.
Id. at 57, 60. The plaintiffs alleged, and the Hawaii court considered, only whether the
state constitution was violated. The state equal rights amendment was also 'nvoked. Tactically,
this prevented federal court review (and possible reversal) of a pro-homosexual decision.
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of equal protection. Same-sex couples are denied many legal advan-
tages available to married couples. 8
Although American courts unanimously have rejected legal claims
for same-sex marriage recognition, 9 the Hawaii court concluded that
none of the prior cases had addressed equal protection claims directly.
The definitional argument (that marriage, by definition, must involve
spouses of different sex) accepted in some previous cases was dismissed
as "tautological and circular.""0 Relying on the Equal Rights Amend-
ment to the Hawaii Constitution, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that
sex is a "suspect category," and that laws discriminating on the basis
of sex must be subject to "strict scrutiny."" Because the court had
already found the denial of marriage licenses to these couples facially
discriminatory, the court declared that the heterosexual marriage re-
quirement was presumed unconstitutional unless, on remand, the state
shows compelling state interests and narrowly drafted restrictions that
avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights.1
Justice Burns, concurring, acknowledged that discrimination on
the basis of sexual relationship is not necessarily the same as discrimi-
nation on the basis of gender. He suggested, however, that if homosex-
uality were "biologically fated," then discrimination against homosex-
ual relations would be equivalent to discrimination on the basis of sex.t "
Dissenting, Judge Heen urged the court to defer to the legislature
in the making of marriage policy. He also suggested that the heterosex-
I Id. at 57-62. However, an applicant for a marriage license for a same-sex relationship is not
denied a marriage license on account of his or her sex, but on account of the -'marriage" relation-
ship he or she wishes to have. Both men and women equally may marry persons of the other sex,
while same-sex couples of both sexes equally are denied marriage licenses. The court apparently
confuses discrimination on account of sex with discrimination on account of sexual relation-
ship--not an insignificant mistake.
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn.
1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1984); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
" Id. (This phrase, of course, is tautological and redundant.)
" Baehr. 852 P.2d at 67.
" The Hawaii court declared that the argument that heterosexual marriage requirements do
not discriminate on the basis of sex "was expressly considered and rejected in Loving [v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967)]." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67-68. With this summary misstatement, the court at-
tempted to evade analysis by erroneously invoking stare decisis.
13 Id.
" However, a "biologically-fated" trait need not be suspect. It would be no more accurate to
say that discrimination based on sexual orientation is the same as discrimination against gender
than to say that discrimination on account of race, hair color, height and IQ (which, of course, are
"biologically fated" characteristics) are all the same.
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ual marriage requirement promotes the legislative purpose of fostering
and protecting the propagation of the human race through heterosexual
marriage. 15
The Hawaii Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court
to apply "strict judicial scrutiny." Thus, -at this time Baehr is still es-
sentially a non-decision. However, inasmuch as it represents the latest
and most sympathetic review of claims to same-sex marriage, it has
provoked widespread enthusiasm among gays and lesbians.
2. Antenuptial Agreements
The many cases involving antenuptial agreements reveal that
American courts in 1993 generally were more inclined to circumvent or
invalidate antenuptial agreements than to enforce them. Often the
courts narrowly construed premarital contracts to protect parties from
an unforeseen and apparently unintended consequence of the agree-
ments. For example, an Alabama court ruled that an antenuptial
agreement waiving all claims against the respective estates of each
spouse did not bar a wife from sharing in a wrongful death recovery. 6
Likewise, a federal court held that a premarital agreement, in which
each party waived any survivor's interest in probate property, did not
operate to waive the wife's claim to her husband's pension following his
death." In other cases, state courts declined to enforce agreements lim-
iting judicial power to achieve "economic justice" upon divorce. 8 How-
ever, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that a prenuptial contract provid-
ing for arbitration of alimony and child support disputes was
enforceable.' 9
" Id. at 74.
" Steele v. Steele, 623 So. 2d 1140 (Ala. 1993).
17 Petro Enter., Inc. v. Perdue, 998 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1993).
11 See Hess v. Hess, 1993 WL 453692 (Ariz. Ct. App., Nov. 4, 1993) (antenuptial agree-
ment leaving wife of twelve years with little of doctor-husband's $2 million assets violates public
policy); In re Marriage of Dechant, 867 P.2d 193 (Colo. 1993) (award of maintenance despite
antenuptial agreement if contract provisions unconscionable); see also In re Foran, 834 P.2d 1081
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (premarital agreement not enforced because evidence of domestic violence
and inadequate provision for wife).
" Kelm v. Kelm, 623 N.E.2d 39 (Ohio 1993) (mutual consent to arbitrate disputes is widely
recognized, and other jurisdictions generally have upheld the arbitration of support issues).
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B. Regulation of Ongoing Marriages and Quasi-Marital Relations
Legal protection for a zone of privacy around ongoing marriage
continued to erode during 1993, for both good and ill. Courts showed
no reluctance to "intervene" to prevent or punish spousal abuse. The
Supreme Court of the United States ruled that prosecution of a man
for criminally assaulting his wife, after he was punished for the same
acts with criminal contempt for violating a protective order, did not
necessarily violate the double jeopardy prohibition of the Constitu-
tion. 20 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that spouse abuse is a
crime of "moral turpitude" for which an alien may be deported. 21 In
two separate cases, state courts punished violation of protective orders
with criminal sanctions. 22 The Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that
the spousal testimonial privilege does not preclude a divorcing wife
from testifying against her husband in his prosecution for violating a
restraining order and breaking into the marital home with intent to
commit larceny.23
Three significant 1993 decisions limited interspousal immunity. In
a case in which a wife sued her husband for her paralysis resulting
from an automobile accident when he was driving, the Delaware Su-
preme Court abolished the doctrine of interspousal immunity for negli-
gence cases.24 Likewise, the Florida Supreme Court abolished inter-
spousal immunity in cases involving intentional attacks (in this case a
machete attack by the husband on the wife). 25 Also, the Maine Su-
21 United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993). The fragmented Court ruled that there
cannot be subsequent prosecution for offenses containing the same elements. Because the man's
criminal contempt prosecution explicitly required proof that he had committed criminal assault,
the Court ruled that his subsequent prosecution for criminal assault was barred by the double
jeopardy clause. However, later charges against him for threatening to injure and assault with
intent to kill, because they did not involve the identical elements, were not barred, even though
based on the same acts as the criminal contempt.
21 Grageda v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 12 F.3d 919 (9th Cir.
1993).
22 See, e.g., Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (both criminal contempt and criminal prosecution for
assault with intent to kill); People v. Szpara, 492 N.W.2d 804 (Mich. 1992) (breaking and enter-
ing own home); see also Dawson v. Kentucky, 867 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (statements
wife made to police properly admitted after she declined to testify at trial of husband for assault-
ing her).
23 Michigan v. Pohl, 507 N.W.2d 819 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
24 Beattie v. Beattie, 630 A.2d 1096 (Del. 1993).
2 Waite v. Waite. 618 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993). See also Cater v. Cater, 846 S.W.2d 173
(Ark. 1993) (affirming verdict of $20,000 compensatory and $350,000 punitive damages for inju-
ries inflicted during marriage).
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preme Court ruled that interspousal immunity did not bar a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
26
However, protection for marriages from the actions of third parties
weakening spousal relations was diminished in some cases.27 A Califor-
nia court ruled that a husband had no claim against the therapist who
seduced his wife because the therapist did not specifically intend to
hurt the husband. 28 Likewise, the Oklahoma Supreme court rejected a
husband's claim against a church whose minister gave allegedly harm-
ful marital counsel to him while having an affair with his wife."
C. Regulation of Marriage Termination and Relations Between For-
mer Spouses
Alimony opinions reveal no clear trend in emerging doctrine or
theory. Judicially determined need is still the touchstone for alimony
awards in most courts,30 while "fault" remains a significant considera-
tion in many. a" Several courts invalidated short and stingy awards of
rehabilitative alimony following long-term marriages.3 2  Regarding
20 Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135 (Me. 1993); see also Thompson v. Dulaney, 970
F.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1992) (no "interspousal" immunity from or exception to federal law prohibit-
ing wiretapping telephone conversations).
27 But cf., Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1992) (rejecting a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress by an unmarried woman whose boyfriend secretly videotaped their
sexual trysts and showed the tape to third parties).
21 Smith v. Pust, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (Ct. App. 1993). The court reasoned (in Carrollian
logic that would make Alice proud): "People usually have sex for other reasons than to annoy
third parties." Id. at 372.
20 Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church, 857 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1993). See also D.D. v. C.L.D.,
600 So. 2d 219 (Ala. 1992) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim barred because
plaintiff really claimed alienation of affections); Saunders v. Alford, 607 So. 2d 1214 (Miss. 1992)
(abolishing criminal conversation but retaining alienation of affections); Russo v. Sutton, 422
S.E.2d 750 (S.C. 1992) (abolishing alienation of affections). But see Kirk v. Koch, 607 So. 2d
1220 (Miss. 1992) (upholding alienation of affections award); USAA Property & Casualty Co. v.
Rowland, 435 S.E.2d 879 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993) (insurer not obligated under homeowners policy to
defend insured in an action for alienation of affections).
30 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Olson, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480 (Ct. App. 1993); Downs v.
Downs, 621 A.2d 229 (Vt. 1993).
"' Matthews v. Matthews, 614 So. 2d 1287 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (abandonment); Smith v.
Smith, 847 P.2d 827 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993) (fault relevant to need); Brabec v. Brabec, 510
N.W.2d 762 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (murder contract); but see Barnes v. Barnes, 428 S.E.2d 294
(Va. Ct. App. 1993) (post-separation adultery did not bar alimony).
32 See, e.g., Mathis v. Mathis, 620 A.2d 174 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993) (18-month award inade-
quate); Rabie v. Ogaki, 860 P.2d 785 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (maximum four-year award inade-
quate after 18-year marriage). See also In re Marriage of Pearson, 603 N.E.2d 720 (III. App. Ct.
1992) (36-month award inadequate where wife has medical problems); Kapfer v. Kapfer, 419
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property division, courts in 1993 tended to exclude disputed items of
property from the marital estate.33
III. THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
Several strands run through the law relating to children in the
United States. Two of the most important filaments involve the coinci-
dence of children's and parents' rights and the question of how family
law functions in a federal system. The noteworthy cases primarily in-
volve creation and termination of the parent-child relationship.
A. Regulation of the Creation of the Parent-Child Relationship
1. Jurisdiction
Even the "special proficiency developed by state tribunals" "3 has
not prevented substantial jurisdictional uncertainty in custody and
adoption cases. The geographic mobility of Americans has caused in-
terjurisdictional family law problems that plague legislators35 and
courts.
3 6
The celebrated case of In re Baby Girl Clausen (Schmidt v. De-
Boer), 7 is an example of these jurisdictional problems in the adoption
context. The child (known as "Baby Jessica") was born in February of
S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1992) (remanding rehabilitative award to 51-year-old housewife who had not
worked outside of home in twenty years).
" See Fields v. Fields, 625 N.E.2d 1266 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (assets of business started by
husband after separation preceding unsuccessful reconciliation attempt excluded); Alston v. Al-
ston, 629 A.2d 70 (Md. 1993) (man's lottery winnings between prior dismissed divorce and pre-
sent divorce not included); Hartog v. Hartog, 605 N.Y.S.2d 749 (App. Div. 1993) (annual em-
ployment bonuses accrued before filing excluded); Miller v. Miller, 428 S.E.2d 547 (W. Va. 1993)
(farm and house deeded to husband by his mother is exempt from equitable distribution). But see
In re Bekooy, 846 P.2d 1183 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (including husband's post-divorce inheritance
from his mother).
" Ankenbrandt v. Richards. 112 S. Ct. 2206. 2215 (1992).
" See, e.g., Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994); Fam-
ily Support Act of 1988. 42 U.S.C.A. § 651 (1994); The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act. 9 U.L.A. § 115 (1988): OR REv. STAT § 109.700 (1993); SD LAWS §§ 26-5A-5 to -26
(1994): VA CODE ANN. §§ 20-125 to -144 (Michie 1994); The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act, 9B U.L.A. § 381 (1988). See, e.g., VA CODE ANN §§ 20-88.32-82 (Michie
1994) and the new Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, enacted by the National Conference
on Uniform State Laws in August, 1992, and the House of Delegates of the American Bar Associ-
ation on February 9. 1993.
36 See. e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Schmidt v. DeBoer, 502 N.W.2d
649 (Mich. 1993).
" 501 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). aJf'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 502
N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
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1989, in Iowa. Her biological mother, Cara, immediately placed the
child for adoption. When asked to name the father, Cara gave the
name of another man. After she and the named "father" executed con-
sent for adoption, the DeBoers were granted custody of the child and
returned to their home in Michigan. In February of 1991, the DeBoers
filed for adoption in Iowa. Shortly thereafter, Cara sought to revoke
her consent. She then revealed that she had lied about the identity of
the child's biological father, Daniel Schmidt. Schmidt worked at the
same place as Cara and knew she was pregnant but believed that he
was not the father. Schmidt filed in Iowa seeking to intervene in the
DeBoer's adoption proceeding. In January of 1992, the Iowa trial court
voided the adoption because Schmidt's parental rights had never been
terminated and because Cara had signed her consent to adoption before
the statutory post-birth waiting period had expired. The DeBoers ap-
pealed to the Iowa Supreme Court, which rejected their argument that
a "best interests of the child" analysis governed the issue of
termination. 8
On the same day their rights were terminated in Iowa, the
DeBoers filed a petition in Michigan under the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 9 arguing that Michigan had jurisdiction
because the child had resided there for all but three weeks of her life.
The Michigan court entered an ex parte order that Schmidt not re-
move the child from the county. Schmidt filed an action to dissolve the
preliminary injunction and to recognize and enforce the Iowa order
granting him custody. Schmidt argued that he had been denied his pa-
rental right to develop a relationship with the child 0 and that the
DeBoers lacked standing to initiate a custody dispute. Schmidt ulti-
mately prevailed because, under the UCCJA, Michigan was precluded
from exercising jurisdiction if there was a pending proceeding in an-
other state.4' Further, the court reasoned that the DeBoers lacked
Schmidt, 501 N.W.2d at 195.
39 9A U.L.A. 123 (1988), MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 600.651-673 (1981).
40 The right of unwed fathers to develop relationships with their children unless unfit is re-
quired by Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). By this time, Schmidt had married the child's
natural mother. The opposite result was reached on the merits in Robert 0. v. Russell K., 604
N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1992). See also In re Karen A.B., 513 A.2d 770 (Del. 1986). In both cases, the
court did not void the adoption although the natural father remained unaware of child's existence
until after the adoption was granted.
" Schmidt, 501 N.W.2d at 196.
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standing to bring their Michigan action because the Iowa decision had
stripped them of any legal claim to custody.42
When the DeBoers appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, it
affirmed because the UCCJA and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act (PKPA)43 deprived Michigan courts of jurisdiction over the cus-
tody dispute and required enforcement of Iowa orders granting the
Schmidts custody.44 Further, the Supreme Court of Michigan found
that the DeBoers lacked standing to sue.
This decision is based upon the presumption that children's rights
do not conflict with their parents' absent a showing of unfitness.45 The
court concluded that "it is now time for the adults to move beyond
saying that their only concern is the welfare of the child" and to assure
that the transfer of custody causes minimal disruption of the child's
life.46 The practical effect, however, was to forcibly remove a two-year-
old child from the stable home into which her biological mother had
voluntarily placed her just days after her birth and in which she had
lived happily all of her life. The human dimension provoked a firestorm
of public controversy.
2. Unorthodox Adoptive Couples
Recently, several state courts have confronted cases in which gay
or lesbian couples wished to adopt children.4" During 1993, several
2 d. at 197.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
" The court reasoned that if the PKPA mandated a best interests analysis in Iowa, that
would permit the forum state's view of the merits to determine jurisdiction. The court found such
a result in direct conflict with Congress' directive that each state is free to fashion its own sub-
stantive family law within constitutional limitations. Schmidt, 502 N.W.2d at 658.
Id. at 666.
, Id. at 668. The decision is criticized in Joan Hollinger, A Failed System is Tearing Kids
Apart, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 17. A dissenting opinion concluded that because Iowa was not
the home state having jurisdiction within the meaning of the PKPA, Michigan need not enforce
the Iowa decree transferring custody. Further, the Michigan action did not involve the same issue
as the Iowa decision (i.e. that Schmidt was the biological father and not unfit).. Schmidt, 502
N.W.2d at 678 (dissenting opinion).
" Although a few states explicitly prohibit homosexual adoption (See Ft A STAT ANN
§ 63.042(8) (West 1994): N.H REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (1993); see also Roe v. Roe, 324
S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985): In re Interest of Z.J.H., 162 Wis. 2d 1002 (1991)) most do not. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-726a (West 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN ch. 151B, § 4 (West
1994). See generally Judith A. Lintz, The Opportunities, or Lack Thereof for Homosexual
Adults to Adopt Children, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 471 (1991); Shaista Parveen, Homosexual
Parenting: Child Custody and Adoption, 22 U C DAvis L. REV 1009 (1989).
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courts allowed one partner to adopt the other's child. For example, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court finalized adoption in Adoption of
Tammy,4 8 in which the two women in question both were related bio-
logically to the five-year-old child.49 The court further held that "when
a natural parent is a party to a joint adoption petition, that parent's
legal relationship to the child does not terminate on entry of the adop-
tion decree." 50 Although the adults' sexual preferences dominated this
court's analysis in this case, and the potentially serious effects on chil-
dren of being raised in a lesbian home were not seriously examined,
some would argue that children always benefit from the greater stabil-
ity and financial security that adoption provides.51
Finally, in Adoption of BLVB,52 the Vermont Supreme Court held
that "when the family unit is comprised of the natural mother and her
partner, and the adoption is in the best interests of the children, termi-
nating the natural mother's right is unreasonable and unnecessary." A
psychologist who had evaluated the family unit testified that "it was
essential for the children to be assured of a continuing relationship"
and recommended that the "adoptions be allowed for the psychological
and emotional protection of the children.153
3. Surrogate Mothers
Legal recognition of surrogate parenting continues to be conten-
tious in the United States. Several states have enacted legislation
prohibiting or otherwise regulating surrogacy.54 In Johnson v. Cal-
48 619 N.E.2d 315 (1993). See also In re Evan, 538 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Surr. Ct N.Y. Co. 1992).
40 The sperm donor was one woman's cousin, while the other was the child's natural mother.
00 Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 321.
01 See generally Susan Golornbok et al., Children in Lesbian and Other Single Parent
Households: Psychosexual and Psychiatric Appraisal, 24 J. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY
531 (1983); Nancy P. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEo. L.J.
459 (1990).
02 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
03 Id. at 1272
04 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10A-34 (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (1994); ARK,
CODE ANN. § 19-10-201 (Michie 1993); CAL. REV. C 9 DE §§ 8502, 8609 (1994); IND. CODE ANN.§ 31-8-2-1 (Burns 1994); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.1 (West 1994) (allowing so long as not
for financial gain); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 122 (McKinney 1994) (prohibiting); VA CODE ANN.
§ 63.1-220.3 (Michie 1994) (regulating); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.230 (West 1994) (not
for financial gain). See generally Walter Wadlington, Contracts to Bear a Child: The Mixed
Legislative Signals, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 383 (1993).
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vert,55 the California Supreme Court found the surrogacy agreement
between the genetic parents and the surrogate implanted with their fer-
tilized embryo did not offend the state or federal constitution nor public
policy. The surrogate was therefore not the "natural parent" entitled to
custody or visitation with the child. The court suggested that the legis-
lature resolve the public policy questions, because it could study empir-
ical data and develop values of general applicability.56
4. Revoking Consent to Adoption
In several recent cases, prospective adoptive fathers refused to con-
tinue the adoption when their marriages ended. In two of the cases,5 7
the father's adoption was not completed, and he was not required to
make child support payments following the divorce. In the third,58 the
father was estopped under very similar circumstances. "The father's
actions in bringing the babies halfway around the world" plus his "in-
dications of financial ability and commitment to her upbringing"" ef-
fectively estopped him from revoking, because the children's welfare
might be jeopardized.
B. Regulating Ongoing Parent-Child Relations
Courts continued to pierce parent-child immunity to allow claims
against parents for sexual abuse of children.60 Courts in Alaska, Mas-
851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
" Recent articles on surrogacy include Alexander M. Capron & Margaret Radin, Choosing
Family Law over Contract Law as a Paradigm for Surrogate Motherhood, SURROGATE MOTHER-
HOOD: POtITICS AND PRIVACY (Larry 0. Gostin, ed. 1990); Anne Goodwin, Determination of
Legal Parentage in Egg Donation, Embryo Transplantation and Gestational Surrogacy Arrange-
ments, 26 FAM. LQ. 275 (1992); Herbert T. Krimmel, Can Surrogate Parenting Be Stopped? An
Inspection of the Constitutional and Pragmatic Aspects of Outlawing Surrogate Mother Ar-
rangements, 27 VAL. U.L. REv I (1992); Marjorie Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-
Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REV 297.
5 Fenn v. Fenn, 847 P.2d 129 (Ariz. 1992); Stein v. Stein, 831 S.W.2d 684 (Mo. App.
1992). The Fenn court noted that under some circumstances he might be estopped from denying
an obligation to support a putative child. Fenn, 847 P.2d at 135.
11 In re Baby Boy C., 596 N.Y.S.2d 56 (C. App. 1993).
51 Id. at 58.
'o Roberts v. Caton, 619 A.2d 844 (Conn. 1993) (statute of limitations extension applied
retroactively to allow sexual abuse claims against grandfather). See also Barnes v. Barnes, 603
N.E.2d 1337 (Ind. 1992) (parental immunity does not apply to sexual assault claims); Doe v.
Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511 (N.C. 1992) (no parental immunity for sexual molestation claims).
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sachusetts and Michigan approved unconventional trial procedures and
admission of disputed evidence in child abuse cases.61
C. Termination of Parental Rights
Several states have enacted legislation detailing ways in which
children may become emancipated.62 In addition, some recent cases
have discussed ways in which children can free themselves from paren-
tal ties while they are minors.
Despite the enormous publicity when a Florida lower court appar-
ently allowed him to "divorce" his parents, Gregory Kingsley ulti-
mately was barred from bringing an action on his own behalf to termi-
nate the rights of his parents.63 However, after Gregory's attorney had
filed a petition on his behalf as his next friend, the court terminated his
mother's parental rights.6 4
In another well-known case from Florida,65 fourteen-year-old
Kimberly Mays, who had been switched at birth with another baby,
was significantly more successful in her suit to terminate her relation-
ship with her natural parents. The court found that it would be detri-
mental to her to force any contact with the Twiggs66 or to declare them
to be her biological parents.6 7 In this case, the court stated specifically
that the interests of the child were its most important concern, and the
court rejected the natural parents' contention "that their interests,
61 Nunn v. State, 845 P.2d 435 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (admission of videotaped interviews
after witness recanted her sexual abuse allegations against stepfather); Commonwealth v. Twitch-
ell, 617 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1993) (Christian Science couple could be guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter for failing to provide medical treatment for son, but reversing conviction because of
erroneous evidentiary ruling); In re Brock, 499 N.W.2d 752 (Mich. 1993) (videotaped interviews
of child may be examined after expert testifies that child will suffer psychological harm if required
to testify).
62 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-150d (West 1994); ILL REV. STAT ch. 750, acts
30/1-11 (1994); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 366 (West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.4
(West 1994); NEv. REV. STAT. § 129.080 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-6-2 to -8 (Michie 1994);
OR. REV. STAT. § 109.565 (1993). See also Emancipating Children in Modern Times, 25 U.
MICH. J.L REF. 239 (1992).
63 Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). See generally Jerri
A. Blair, Gregory K. and Emerging Children's Rights, 29 TRIAL 22 (1993); Mark Hansen, Boy
Wins 'Divorce' from Mom; Critics Claim Ruling will Encourage Frivolous Suits by Dissatisfied
Kids, 78 B.A.J. 16 (1992); Georgia Sargeant, 'Parental Divorce' Cases Highlight Need for Chil-
dren's Advocates, 29 TRIAL 88 (1988).
64 Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 784.
6 May v. Twigg, 1993 WL 330624 (Fla. 1993).
66 Id. at *3.
67 Id. at *6.
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whatever they might be, are paramount." 8 Ironically, just months af-
ter the court severed all contact between Kimberly and her biological
parents, Kimberly left the man who had raised her and for whom she
had in court professed unending filial commitment, and voluntarily
moved in with her biological parents, the Twiggs.
IV. CONCLUSION
American courts in 1993 did little to slow the rampant and grow-
ing lack of appreciation for families and the sacrifices and investments
made by spouses and parents. Many courts approached the conse-
quences of family disintegration with an "anything goes" attitude. Di-
lemmas resulting from abandoning children to their "rights" continued
to stump the courts. Homosexual relationships are the latest alternative
lifestyle to mimic and claim parity with marital and parental relations.
In short, the identity crisis of American family law was not resolved in
1993.
68 Id. at *5.
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